



Co-funded by the  
Erasmus+ Programme  
of the European Union



# Signature Schemes

Truong Tuan Anh  
CSE-HCMUT

# Outline

- Signature schemes
- RSA signature scheme

# Context

- A “conventional” handwritten signature
  - **Attached** to a document
  - **Specify** the person **responsible** for the document
  - Used in **everyday** situations: writing a letter. Withdrawing money, signing a contract, ...
- **Electronic** document?
  - **Digital** Signatures = Signature Schemes
- A method of **signing** a message stored in **electronic** form and can be **transmitted** over a computer network



# Digital vs. Conventional Signatures

- Signing a document
  - Conventional Signatures: a **part** of the **physical document** being signed
  - Digital Signatures: **not attached** physically to the message being signed; There is an algorithm to “**bind**” the signature to the message
- Verification
  - Conventional Signatures: **compare** to authentic signatures; **Not a very secure** method
  - Digital Signatures: can be **verified** by a **public verification algorithm**; Prevent the possibility of **forgeries**

# Signature Schemes

- A signature Scheme: consists of two components
  - A signing algorithm
  - A verification algorithm
- Alice signs a message using the private signing algorithm
- Bob verifies the signature using Alice's corresponding public verification algorithm

# Signature Schemes

A *signature scheme* is a five-tuple  $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{V})$ , where:

1.  $\mathcal{P}$  is a finite set of possible *messages*
2.  $\mathcal{A}$  is a finite set of possible *signatures*
3.  $\mathcal{K}$ , the *keyspace*, is a finite set of possible keys
4. For each  $K \in \mathcal{K}$ , there is
  - a *signing algorithm*  $\mathbf{sig}_K \in \mathcal{S}$  and
  - a corresponding *verification algorithm*  $\mathbf{ver}_K \in \mathcal{V}$ .

# Signature Schemes (cont.)

Each

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{sig}_K &: \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{A} \text{ and} \\ \mathbf{ver}_K &: \mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \{true, false\} \end{aligned}$$

are functions such that the following equation is satisfied:  
for every message  $x \in \mathcal{P}$  and for every signature  $y \in \mathcal{A}$ :

$$\mathbf{ver}_K(x, y) = \begin{cases} true & \text{if } y = \mathbf{sig}_K(x) \\ false & \text{if } y \neq \mathbf{sig}_K(x). \end{cases}$$

A pair  $(x, y)$  with  $x \in \mathcal{P}$  and  $y \in \mathcal{A}$  is called a signed message.

# Signature Schemes: Notes

- The functions **sig**<sub>K</sub> and **ver**<sub>K</sub> should be polynomial-time functions
- **sig**<sub>K</sub> is the **private** function and **ver**<sub>K</sub> is the **public** function
- It should be computationally infeasible for anyone than Alice to compute a signature  $y$  such that **ver**<sub>K</sub>( $x, y$ ) = *true*
- If Oscar can compute  $y$  such that **ver**<sub>K</sub>( $x, y$ ) = *true*, then  $y$  is a **forgery**

# Signature Schemes: An Example

- RSA cryptosystem can be **used** to provide digital signatures

→ RSA signature scheme

- Alice **signs** a message using the RSA decryption rule  $\mathbf{d}_K = \mathbf{sig}_K$
- Anyone can **verify** the signature using the RSA **encryption rule**  $\mathbf{e}_K = \mathbf{ver}_K$
- Anyone can **forge** Alice's RSA signature by **randomly choosing**  $y$  and computing if  $x = \mathbf{e}_K(y)$

# Signature Schemes: An Example

## *RSA Signature Scheme*

Let  $n = pq$ , where  $p$  and  $q$  are primes. Let  $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{A} = \mathbb{Z}_n$ , and define

$$\mathcal{K} = \{(n, p, q, a, b) : n = pq, p, q \text{ prime}, ab \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}\}.$$

The values  $n$  and  $b$  are the public key, and the values  $p, q, a$  are the private key.

For  $K = (n, p, q, a, b)$ , define

$$\mathbf{sig}_K(x) = x^a \bmod n$$

and

$$\mathbf{ver}_K(x, y) = \text{true} \Leftrightarrow x \equiv y^b \pmod{n}$$

$$(x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_n).$$

# RSA Signature Scheme: How it works

- Alice wishes to send an **encrypted, signed message** to Bob (given the **plaintext** is  $x$ )
  1. Alice **computes** her signature  $y = \mathbf{sig}_{Alice}(x)$
  2. Alice **encrypts** both  $x$  and  $y$  using  $\mathbf{e}_{Bob}$ , then  $z = \mathbf{e}_{Bob}(x, y)$
  3. Alice **sends**  $z$  to Bob
  4. Bob **receives**  $z$
  5. Bob **decrypts**  $z$  using  $\mathbf{d}_{Bob}$  to get  $x, y$
  6. Bob **uses** Alice's public verification function to check that  $\mathbf{ver}_{Alice}(x, y) = \text{true}$

# RSA Signature Scheme: How it works

- Alice wishes to send an **encrypted, signed message** to Bob (given the **plaintext** is  $x$ )
  1. Alice **encrypts** both  $x$  using  $e_{Bob}$ , then  $z = e_{Bob}(x)$
  2. Alice **computes** her signature  $y = \mathbf{sig}_{Alice}(z)$
  3. Alice **sends**  $(z, y)$  to Bob
  4. Bob **receives**  $(z, y)$
  5. Bob **decrypts**  $z$  using  $d_{Bob}$  to get  $x$
  6. Bob **uses** Alice's public verification function to check that  $\mathbf{ver}_{Alice}(z, y) = \text{true}$
- What is the problem?

# Signature Schemes: In Reality

